The markets for products and geographic markets relevant to vertical agreements are defined in the same way as for other agreements or practices. These are evidence-based studies that depend on the substitutability of other products or regions. Since, as the name suggests, parties to vertical agreements operate at different levels, there will be different product markets for each company. Compared to other vertical agreements, there is more flexibility. For example, the following types of agreements are not considered “pure” under the category exemption (they are called “non-hardcore”): whether a vertical agreement actually limits competition and whether, in this case, the benefits outweigh the anti-competitive effects often depends on the market structure. The modern trend is for the courts to treat agreements between distributors and manufacturers acting as distributors competing with their distributors as vertical agreements subject to general review. Vertical agreements are generally analyzed in accordance with Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 USC No. 1, which declares any contract, combination or conspiracy to restrict trade illegal. The section 1 violation requires proof of three elements: 1) the existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more separate entities; (2) unduly withholds trade; (3) has an impact on intergovernmental or foreign trade. However, vertical agreements may present competitive risks if .B potential to increase barriers to entry, reduce or mitigate competition, and avoid other opportunities in the event of horizontal agreements.
 1.1 Which authorities or agencies review and enforce legislation on vertical agreements and dominant behaviour? Article 101, paragraph 1 of the TFUE prohibits agreements between companies with the purpose or effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition within the Union and affecting trade between EU Member States. This prohibition is relevant to all agreements between two or more companies, whether they are competitors. Vertical agreements are usually analyzed according to the rule of reason. Unlike horizontal agreements, the agreement itself is not taken into account. The rule analysis focuses on whether the party seeking to impose the restriction has market power. If there is market power, then the court will check whether the competition has been harmed. The court may consider the nature and scope of a possible enforced execution, the duration of the agreement, the size of the advance, the effect on the importation, the actual effect, the extent of other similar agreements and any other relevant evidence of injury. This evidence is then taken into account against all competitive advantages, efficiencies or other mitigating factors. In the case of vertical agreements, the benefits and efficiencies that promote competition are generally quite significant.
Some states may analyze certain types of vertical agreements that are in violation per se. Both the FTC and DOJ have the power to take legal action to block a deal if they conclude that a merger could tend to significantly weaken competition. Because such disputes are costly and time-consuming for the concentration parties, agencies have enormous leverage to negotiate a voluntary solution to problematic overlapping areas, for example. B through assignment or approval (although the current DOJ has a strong preference for structural behavioural assistance). As a result, cases are much more likely to be resolved through voluntary settlement than through adversarial disputes. For example, the most recent case was the first case of vertical concentration since 1977. Nevertheless, the two agencies often collaborate on guidelines and agreements on cartels and abuse of dominant positions with foreign jurisdictions. 2.2 What analysis should (a) examine the question of the existence of an agreement and (b) whether that agreement is vertical? There are no explicit immunities, exceptions or safe havens, but courts generally maintain